Current Research.
What is justified belief? This is arguably one of the most central questions in philosophy; and it has generated one of the most hotly discussed issues in contemporary epistemology. In particular, since Gettier’s famous counterexamples to the view that knowledge is justified true belief, many epistemologists have attempted to answer this question in the hope to rescue or find a plausible alternative to that view. This question has recently received even more attention, given that, according to knowledge-first epistemologists, it is impossible to give the answer sought by epistemological orthodoxy to the question ‘What is the nature of knowledge?'.
My current research aims to defend a very unorthodox answer to the question 'What is justified belief?': one can justifiably believe a proposition if and only if one knows it. Since this view is at odds with epistemological orthodoxy, although a handful of epistemologists have argued for it, unsurprisingly, it has been extensively criticized in the literature. I agree with the critics that either the arguments advanced in its favor are not sufficiently strong to properly motivate its acceptance, or their success decisively depends on whether some other very contentious views are right. Accordingly, my goal is to offer an original consequentialist defense of this view. In other words, my research ventures to show that, if one takes seriously the consequentialist intuition that belief is justified only when it promotes the primary epistemic good, then the view that one cannot be justified unless one knows proves to be the most preferable in the literature.
Here is a link to a summary of my doctoral research project.
My current research aims to defend a very unorthodox answer to the question 'What is justified belief?': one can justifiably believe a proposition if and only if one knows it. Since this view is at odds with epistemological orthodoxy, although a handful of epistemologists have argued for it, unsurprisingly, it has been extensively criticized in the literature. I agree with the critics that either the arguments advanced in its favor are not sufficiently strong to properly motivate its acceptance, or their success decisively depends on whether some other very contentious views are right. Accordingly, my goal is to offer an original consequentialist defense of this view. In other words, my research ventures to show that, if one takes seriously the consequentialist intuition that belief is justified only when it promotes the primary epistemic good, then the view that one cannot be justified unless one knows proves to be the most preferable in the literature.
Here is a link to a summary of my doctoral research project.
Publications.
- Forthcoming. 'No Justificatory Closure without Truth', Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
- Forthcoming. 'The Lottery, the Preface, and Epistemic Rule Consequentialism' (with C. Kelp), in I. Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Talks.
- 'A Consequentialist Argument for Putting Knowledge First,' GAP.10, University of Cologne, Germany, Sep 17-20, 2018.
- 'Justification, Being in a Position to Know, and Closure,' Kinds of Reasoning: IV FINO Graduate Conference in Mind, Language, and Science, University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy, Sep 3-4, 2018 (Winner of the Prize for the Best Paper).
- 'No Closure without Truth,' The 92nd Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Oxford, England, Jul 6-8, 2018.
- 'A Consequentialist Argument for Putting Knowledge First,' European Epistemology Network Conference, VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Jun 28-30, 2018.
- 'No Closure without Truth,' 8th Annual Edinburgh Graduate Epistemology Conference, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, Jun 25-26, 2018.
- 'What Is Our Epistemic Goal?,' First Flemish Epistemology Workshop, KU Leuven, Belgium, May 18-19, 2018.
- 'What Is Our Epistemic Goal?,' University of Graz, Austria, Apr 30, 2018.
- 'No Closure without Truth,' MLAG Graduate Conference II, University of Porto, Portugal, Mar 21-23, 2018.
- 'Justification, Being in a Position to Know, and Moorean Absurdities,' First Leuven-Paris Analytic Philosophy Workshop: Epistemology, KU Leuven, Belgium, Jan 19, 2018.
- 'A Consequentialist Argument for Putting Knowledge First,' Brown Bag Seminar, KU Leuven, Belgium, Dec 8, 2017.
- 'No Closure without Truth,' CLAW Seminar, KU Leuven, Belgium, Nov 27, 2017.
- 'What Is Our Epistemic Goal?,' Understanding Value VI, University of Sheffield, England, Jul 19-21, 2017.
- 'What Is Our Epistemic Goal?,' New Trends in Epistemology: III FINO Graduate Conference in Mind, Language and Science, University of Pavia, Italy, Jun 12-13, 2017.
- 'Lotteries, Prefaces, and Epistemic Goals,' 4th Cologne-Leuven Epistemology Meeting, KU Leuven, Belgium, May 18-19, 2017.
- 'How to Solve Two Dilemmas for the Credit View of Knowledge,' LEG Seminar, KU Leuven, Belgium, Nov 15, 2016.
- 'How to Solve Two Dilemmas for the Credit View of Knowledge,' 3rd Cologne-Leuven Epistemology Meeting, University of Cologne, Germany, Nov 4-5, 2016.
- 'Lotteries, Prefaces, and Epistemic Goals,' LEG Seminar, KU Leuven, Belgium, Apr 29, 2016.
- 'Is any Version of EEE de dicto Right?,' Epistemic Norms Conference, Pre-Conference Graduate Workshop, KU Leuven, Belgium, Nov 8-11, 2015.
- 'Is any Version of EEE de dicto Right?,' 1st Cologne-Leuven Epistemology Meeting, University of Cologne, Germany, Oct 30-31, 2015.
- 'Truth in Virtue of at Most One Reference Determiner,' Fifth HIW Graduate Student Conference, KU Leuven, Belgium, Mar 27, 2015
- 'Safety-Based Neo-Moorean Stance, Easy Knowledge, and Assertability,' The Epistemology of Perception, Pre-Conference Graduate Workshop, KU Leuven, Belgium, Sep 24-26, 2014.
- 'Safety-Based Neo-Moorean Stance, Easy Knowledge, and Assertability,' Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy, University of Salzburg, Austria, Sep 4-6, 2014.